Britain First

A Public Benefit Test for Non-Citizen Residency and Welfare

Britain’s welfare system is a vital safety net designed to support UK citizens facing financial hardship. Programmes such as Universal Credit, Child Benefit, Personal Independence Payment (PIP), and Housing Benefit, alongside social housing, aim to assist the vulnerable.

These programmes were not intended to provide permanent support for non-citizens living at public expense. Increasingly, however, significant numbers of non-UK nationals access these resources, straining public finances.

Here are six practical steps an incoming government might take to address this issue by restricting non-citizen access to welfare and social housing and deporting those who have been a persistent net fiscal burden:

• Introduce a Public Benefit Test (PBT): Implement a Danish-inspired model to assess non-citizens’ net fiscal contributions over a defined period.

• Restrict Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR): Grant ILR only to non-citizens demonstrating significant, sustained fiscal contributions via the PBT.

• Prohibit Welfare and Social Housing Access: Bar non-UK citizens from accessing benefits or social housing, except in exceptional cases.

• Mandate PBT Assessments: Require all working-age non-citizens receiving benefits or living in social housing to undergo PBT evaluation.

• Deport Non-Citizens that Have Been Persistent Fiscal Burdens: Deport non-UK citizens identified as net fiscal burdens, barring extraordinary circumstances.

• Counter Judicial Resistance: Implement safeguards to prevent judicial challenges from obstructing the policy.

Some might criticize this policy framework because it would lead to large-scale remigration. That is not a criticism; it is the intention.

The Fiscal Burden of Non-Citizen Welfare Claims

Non-UK citizens’ access to welfare and social housing places a significant strain on public resources. According to 2023 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) data, 16% of Universal Credit payments—£941 million monthly—are disbursed to households with at least one foreign national. This trend has accelerated as non-UK nationals with ILR or refugee status gain equal benefit entitlements to British citizens, bypassing nationality-based restrictions under the habitual residence test.

While data on other benefits like Child Benefit and PIP is less granular, non-citizen uptake appears substantial. Office for National Statistics (ONS) data shows that 29.7% of 2023 live births in England and Wales were to non-UK-born mothers. With 6.9 million families receiving Child Benefit, approximately 2 million foreign-born parents may be claimants. Certain ethnic groups, such as Bangladeshi (34%) and Pakistani (30%) households, claim Child Benefit at nearly double the rate of white British households (17%), per 2022 DWP data, reflecting higher uptake among non-UK-born communities.

Social housing data reveals similar trends. The 2021 Census indicates that 47.6% of London’s social housing—housing approximately 948,000 foreign-origin individuals—was occupied by foreign-born lead tenants, including 282,240 non-UK nationals. Nationally, 700,000–750,000 non-UK-born, non-UK-national individuals resided in social housing in 2021, a figure likely higher today due to post-2021 migration surges. These patterns, coupled with London’s demographic shift (the white British population declining from over 80% in 1990 to 36.8% in 2021), underscore the fiscal and social impact of non-citizen reliance on public resources.

Unprecedented Immigration and Its Costs

The UK is experiencing a historic immigration surge. ONS data reports net migration of 906,000 in the year ending June 2023, moderating to 728,000 by June 2024. This wave, driven by relaxed visa policies like the 2021 social care and student visa expansions, saw 144,000 care worker visas issued between 2021 and Q1 2024, despite their £24,000 median salary falling below the UK median of £28,000. Notably, only 16% of the 3.59 million non-EU migrants arriving since 2021 entered on work visas, per the Centre for Policy Studies, indicating limited economic contribution.

Office for Budget Responsibility data suggests that low-skilled immigrants cost the UK nearly £465,000 each over their lifetime, drawing more in benefits than they pay in taxes. Migration Watch UK has argued that immigration imposes a significant net financial burden on the UK, estimating costs ranging from £4 billion to £17 billion annually, with specific figures of £13 billion in 2014/15 and £4.3 billion in 2016/17 based on government data.

According to a 2013 University College London study, non-Western immigrants cost the public £118 billion between 1995 and 2011. A 2025 Centre for Policy Studies report warns that if recent, largely non-Western “Boris wave” immigrants gain Indefinite Leave to Remain and access benefits, costs could rise by an additional £234 billion.

International studies reinforce the idea that recent immigrants, particularly non-Western ones, are likely to be a net drain. A 2021 Dutch study (Borderless Welfare State) found that non-Western migrants, particularly asylum seekers and family reunification cases, impose lifetime costs of £1.1 million per migrant. A 2005 Danish study (Immigration, Integration and Fiscal Sustainability) similarly concluded that non-Western immigration undermines fiscal sustainability due to weak labour market integration and welfare reliance.

What Is to Be Done?

1. Establishing a Public Benefit Test (PBT)

An Immigration and Fiscal Contribution Act is needed to establish a Public Benefit Test (PBT), modelled on Denmark’s approach, to evaluate non-citizens’ net fiscal contributions over five years. The PBT will calculate:

• Contributions: Income tax, National Insurance, VAT, and other taxes.

• Costs: Welfare benefits (e.g., Universal Credit, Child Benefit), social housing subsidies, NHS usage, and education costs for dependants.

A passing threshold of £5,000 net annual contribution (inflation-adjusted) will be set, reflecting OBR data on low-wage migrant costs. The Act will mandate annual fiscal reports for non-citizens, with visa curtailment for non-compliance. Minors and retirees will be exempt.

Should the UK’s Public Benefit Test focus solely on fiscal contributions, or should it, like Denmark’s model, also include integration criteria, such as English language proficiency?

A PBT implemented by Whitehall civil servants risks becoming an ambiguous requirement to learn English. To avoid this, the PBT should initially be a clear, objective assessment of an individual’s tax contributions minus their welfare costs.

2. Restricting Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR)

ILR grants non-citizens full benefit access, currently conferred after 5 years’ residency. The ILR rules will be amended to:

• Require a PBT pass for ILR eligibility.

• Extend the ILR qualifying period to 10 years, with PBT assessments at 5 and 10 years.

• Deny visa extensions or grant limited leave (e.g., 12 months) for PBT failures, facilitating departure.

Given the extent to which non EEA immigrants have tended overwhelmingly to be a net burden, this measure is likely to reduce the number of people granted ILR very substantially.

3. Prohibiting Non-Citizen Access to Welfare and Social Housing

Despite existing eligibility rules (e.g., Housing Act 1996), non-citizens access benefits and social housing post-ILR. Two laws are needed to address this:

• Welfare Access Restriction Act: Bar non-UK citizens from Universal Credit, Child Benefit, PIP, and social housing unless they hold PBT-passed ILR or British citizenship. This expands the “no recourse to public funds” list under the Immigration Act 2014, removing exceptions like Child Benefit for maintenance undertakings.

• Social Housing Eligibility Act: Amend the Housing Act 1996 and Housing (Wales) Act 2014 to prioritize UK citizens and PBT-passed ILR holders, barring foreign-born, non-UK nationals from social housing except in rare cases (e.g., imminent risk to life, approved by the Secretary of State or Welsh Ministers).

4. Mandatory Public Benefit Test for Non-Citizens

The Immigration and Fiscal Contribution Act will introduce a mandatory PBT for all working-age non-citizens receiving non-pension welfare benefits or residing in social housing.

This is to target the existing cohort of non-citizens who are a long-term fiscal burden. Those that have been a net burden, without any exonerating circumstances such as chronic health conditions, will be subject to deportation proceedings. Non-compliance will trigger deportation proceedings.

5. Deporting Those That Are A Persistent Fiscal Drain

Non-citizens without ILR who fail the PBT will face remigration under ordinary circumstances. The Remigration of Non-UK Nationals Act will amend the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and Immigration Act 2014 to:

• Make PBT failure grounds for residency revocation for non-EEA nationals.

• Establish a process with notification, a 3-month appeal period via an independent panel, and Home Office-led remigration.

• Prioritize remigrations for those with negative PBT scores exceeding £10,000 annually, using an integrated DWP-HMRC-Home Office database.

What if countries refuse to take back their nationals?

In April 2025, South Sudan declined to repatriate a migrant from the United States. The US promptly cancelled all visas for South Sudanese passport holders and restricted future visas. Although there was a question about the migrant’s true nationality, South Sudan eventually accepted the individual, and the migrant was deported from the US.

The UK should adopt a similar no-nonsense approach. Beyond cancelling visas for their citizens, the UK can leverage its significant foreign aid contributions to countries like Pakistan and Nigeria, which have substantial numbers of their nationals living in the UK.

The main barrier to removing non-UK nationals from the UK is not that other countries might not accept them; it is that activist judges will prevent their removal. UK judges have consistently acted to block deportation policies.

6. Countering Judicial Activism

The UK judiciary will challenge this framework, citing the Human Rights Act 1998 (e.g., Article 8, Article 14, Article 3 of the ECHR) or seeking judicial review of the proposed acts. To ensure implementation, the following measures will neutralize judicial overreach:

• Legislative Clarity and Ouster Clauses: Define terms precisely (e.g., “net fiscal burden” as a £5,000+ annual deficit) and include clauses barring judicial review of PBT, ILR, benefit, and remigration decisions, except for procedural fraud.

• Parliamentary Supremacy Clause: Embed a provision in the Immigration and Fiscal Contribution Act affirming Parliament’s ultimate authority over judicial interpretation.

• Human Rights Act Amendment: Allow ministers to disapply ECHR provisions (e.g., Article 8) for PBT-related decisions via Statutory Instruments.

• ECHR Derogation Clause: Permit the Home Secretary to derogate from ECHR obligations for “national economic security,” encompassing fiscal and immigration control.

Even with the most carefully drafted legislation, and even if the ECHR was either disapplied in part, or in full by leaving it, activist judges would almost certainly continue to rule against deportation.

Recent history suggests judges are ruling not on the basis of what they know the law to be, but as an expression of their personal subjective policy preferences. In light of this, the following sanctions against judges are almost certain needed:

• Judicial Accountability Act: Empower the Lord Chancellor to review and discipline judges who defy statutory intent, with sanctions including dismissal. This should be done as emergency legislation in the first few hours of a new administration being formed.

• Judicial Appointment Reform: Amend the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to enhance the Lord Chancellor’s role in appointing judges who uphold parliamentary sovereignty, reducing the Judicial Appointments Commission’s influence.

With over a million non-citizens living at public expense and immigration surging, these measures are critical to safeguard the UK’s economic stability.

This paper is part of a series by Douglas Carswell to offer an incoming government the policies needed to restore Britain. The first, Milestones, which provides an overarching blueprint, was published by The Telegraph in April.